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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a variant of 
Hotelling’s (1929) model involving 
subcontracting production to explore the 
possibility of the validity of the principle 
of Minimum Differentiation.  It shows 
that the equilibrium locations are 
determined by two opposite forces: a 
centripetal force that is generated from 
subcontracting production for saving 
transportation costs of the subcontracted 
input, and a centrifugal force that arises 
from price competition for reducing 
market competition to earn spatial rents.  
It also demonstrates that if the transport 
rate of the subcontracted input is 
sufficiently large relative to that of the 
final product, the principle of Minimum 
Differentiation arises, but the principle of 
Maximum Differentiation occurs if the 
condition is reversed.  Furthermore, the 
two firms will locate together at the 
endpoints of the line market where the 
rival of the Stackelberg leader locates 
instead of agglomerating at the center of 
the line market.  This paper also obtains 
that the fixed cost and the difference of 
marginal costs are crucial in 
subcontractor’s decisions of vertical 
foreclosure and supply. 
 
Key Words: Spatial Competition, Ex Post 
Subcontracting, Stackelberg Leadership 
 
???????  
 
Hotelling (1929) first proposed that 
two firms of a homogeneous product 
agglomerate at the center of the line 
market under linear transportation costs, 
which has been termed the principle of 
Minimum Differentiation.  However, 
D’Aspremont et al. (1979) challenged this 
principle and showed that the two firms 
will locate at the endpoints of the line 
market under quadratic transportation 
costs.  This has been termed the principle 
of Maximum Differentiation. 
It is well recognized that all over the 
industrialized world, subcontracting has 
become an increasingly popular method 
 2 
for firms to organize their production in 
order to enhance competitiveness.  
Subcontracting production is a way for 
firms to seek cheaper suppliers to save 
costs.  It is commonly employed in 
many industries: for example, Ikeda 
(1989) found that a huge number of the 
parts of the automobile industry in Japan, 
the U.S. and Europe are produced by 
subcontractors.  Grossman and Helpman 
(1999) referred to the 1998 annual report 
of the World Trade Organization as 
offering support for the view that only 37 
percent of the production value of a 
representative “American” car is 
generated in the U.S.  Shy and 
Stenbacka (2003) also pointed out that 
many firms in the industrialized world 
subcontract out their productions such as 
laser printer, PC, mobile phone and 
aircraft producers.  More importantly, 
there exists close relationship between 
subcontracting production and location 
agglomeration in the real world.  Scott 
(1991) empirically studied the geography 
of the electronics assembly subcontract 
industry in Southern California and found 
that electronic assembly subcontractors 
are strongly linked in networks of 
transactional interaction with both 
suppliers and customers, and markedly 
agglomerate with their main markets.  
This is fully consistent with the observed 
location symbiosis between assembly 
subcontractors and electronic producers.   
Unfortunately, to the best of our 
knowledge, the role of subcontracting 
production has not been touched upon in 
the location literature.  The present paper 
aims at filling this gap by developing a 
variant of Hotelling’s (1929) duopoly 
model where each firm can alter its 
production cost by subcontracting the 
production of a key intermediate input. 
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The basic model is a variant of 
Hotelling’s (1929) spatial duopoly model.  
Assume that there is a linear market of 
length 1 where consumers are uniformly 
distributed along the unit interval [0, 1].  
Two vertical integrated firms, indexed by 
1 and 2, produce a homogenous final 
product, Q, using a homogenous 
intermediate input, q.  For simplicity, we 
assume that the production of one unit of 
the final product needs to employ one unit 
of the intermediate input.  Suppose that 
subcontracting production arises in the 
intermediate input market.  Firm 1 is the 
consignor due to having a higher 
production cost of the intermediate input, 
while firm 2 is the subcontractor for 
having a lower production cost of the 
input.  Thus, firm 1 subcontracts out the 
part or the whole of the production of the 
intermediate input for saving costs.  The 
location of firm i is denoted by xi Î [0, 1].  
The transportation costs of both the final 
product and intermediate input are 
assumed to take the form of quadratic 
functions of distance.  Each consumer 
buys one unit of the final product from the 
firm with the lower full price, that is, mill 
price plus transportation cost.  Thus, the 
full price of the final product for a 
consumer locate at x who buys from firm i 
is: 2)( ifif xxtp -+ , where pif denotes the 
mill price of the final product offered by 
firm i, and tf is the transport rate of the 
final product per unit of distance. 
Next, with respect to subcontracting 
decision, we analyze, following Spiegel 
(1993), ex post subcontracting, in which 
firms engage in a Bertrand price 
competition in the final product market 
before they decide whether or not to 
subcontract production of the input.  As 
Spiegel has argued, this setting is proper 
and fits the reality.  Therefore, the game 
between firms involves a sub-game 
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perfect equilibrium with three stages of 
decision.  In the first stage, both firms 
simultaneously select their locations.  In 
the second stage, the production locations 
are known and the firms simultaneously 
choose their mill prices, p1f and p2f, 
respectively.  In the third stage, 
following Kamien et al. (1989), either the 
consignor or the subcontractor acts as a 
Stackelberg leader in determining the 
quantity to be subcontracted and the price 
of the subcontracted input to be paid to the 
subcontractor.  In this subcontracting 
stage, we assume that subcontracting 
would be an equilibrium if no firm is 
worse off (since there is no transfer 
payment) and at least one firm better off 
under subcontracting.  The sub-game 
perfect equilibrium of the model is solved 
by backward induction, and we start with 
the final stage. 
 
?. The Consignor Acts as a Stackelberg 
Leader 
 
In this section, we assume that the 
consignor acts as a Stackelberg leader 
while the subcontractor as a follower in 
the intermediate input market.  In this 
setting, the consignor determines the 
quantity of the input to be subcontracted 
and the price of the subcontracted input to 
be paid to the subcontractor in order to 
maximize his subcontracting profits 
subject to the subcontractor’s opportunity 
cost, which is represented by his zero 
subcontracting profits. 
We now turn to the second stage to 
determine the optimal mill prices.  
Substituting psqs=c2qs+F, qs = Q1, and (2.1) 
and (2.2) into (3.1) and (3.2), and then 
differentiating the reduced profit functions 
with respect to p1f and p2f, setting them 
equal to zero, respectively.  
In the first stage, each firm selects 
an optimal location to maximize his total 
profits with the constraints that he has to 
locate within the interval [0, 1] and x1 £ 
x2.   
We can solve for the first-order 
conditions by the use of Kuhn-Tucker 
theorem and then obtain the equilibrium 
locations as follows: 
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We see from (10.1) that the 
equilibrium location of the subcontractor 
is at the right endpoint of the line market 
as the consignor plays a Stackelberg 
leader.  The intuition behind this result is 
as follows.  Actually, there are two 
opposite forces affecting the firms’ 
location decisions in this model.  The 
first force is the competition effect, which 
is a centrifugal force that arises from price 
competition for reducing market 
competition to earn spatial rents.  Since 
the two firms play a Bertrand price game 
in the final product market, the price 
competition between firms will become 
more severe if the two firms locate closer.  
This will lead to a lower price of the final 
product for marginal consumer, and 
decrease firms’ profit from the sale of the 
final product.  Hence, the competition 
effect will make the two firms tend to 
locate as far away as possible to earn the 
spatial rents generated by the existence of 
the transportation costs of the final 
product.  The second one is the 
subcontracting effect, which is a 
centripetal force generated from 
subcontracting production for saving 
transportation costs of the subcontracted 
input.  Hence, the subcontracting effect 
will make the consignor tend to locate 
closer to the subcontractor to save the 
transportation costs of the subcontracted 
input.  The equilibrium locations thus 
hinge upon the relative strength of these 
two forces.  Anticipating that his 
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subcontracting profits will be completely 
deprived in the final stage, the 
subcontracting effect of the subcontractor 
turns out to be null.  The subcontractor 
will choose to locate as far away as 
possible from the rival firm (i.e., the 
consignor) to reduce market competition.  
Thus, the subcontractor will locate at the 
right endpoint of the line market.  
Furthermore, we recognize from equation 
(10.2) that the equilibrium location of the 
consignor is a function of the ratio of the 
transport rates between the subcontracted 
input and the final product, T, i.e., the 
trade-off between a centripetal force 
caused from the transport rate of the 
subcontracted input and a centrifugal 
force from the transport rate of the final 
product.  It clearly follows from (11) that 
the larger the ratio, T, the stronger the 
subcontracting effect (i.e., the centripetal 
force) will be.  This leads to the result 
that the consignor will locate closer to the 
subcontractor.  As the ratio approaches 
infinity, firm 1 will agglomerate with firm 
2 at the right endpoint of the line market 
such that the principle of Minimum 
Differentiation is valid.  On the contrary, 
when the ratio is no greater than one third, 
firm 1 will locate at the other endpoint of 
the line market and then the principle of 
Maximum Differentiation occurs due to a 
very weak subcontracting effect. 
 
? . Vertical Foreclosure vs. Vertical 
Supply 
 
In previous section, we have studied 
firms’ location decisions in the case where 
the subcontractor is willing to supply the 
intermediate input to his rival.  However, 
the subcontractor would provide no 
intermediate input to his rival, when his 
profits are higher under vertical 
foreclosure than vertical supply.  In order 
to study this vertical foreclosure decision, 
we need to compare subcontractor’s 
profits between vertical foreclosure and 
vertical supply.  
While taking vertical foreclosure, 
the consignor is forced to produce his own 
intermediate input.  The subcontracting 
stage is vanished and the game in question 
will be reduced to a two-stage game, in 
which the locations are chosen in the first 
stage and then firms play Bertrand price 
competition. 
In the case of vertical foreclosure, 
instead of the subcontracting effect, the 
centripetal force is represented by the 
cost-advantage effect, which comes from 
the difference of marginal costs between 
firms, because subcontracting production 
is stopped.  The higher the difference of 
marginal costs, the closer the 
subcontractor wants to approach to the 
consignor due to cost advantage.  Since 
there exists no centripetal force for the 
consignor due to cost disadvantage, he 
will always locate at the left endpoint of 
the line market for the possibility of 
charging a higher price of the final 
product.  When the difference of 
marginal costs is large (say greater than 
(4/3)tf), the cost-advantage effect 
outweighs the competition effect and then 
the two firms agglomerate at left endpoint.  
On the contrary, the two firms take apart 
and locate at the opposite endpoints when 
this difference is small (say less than tf).  
Moreover, the consignor locates at the left 
endpoint, while the subcontractor in the 
range (0, 1) when tf £ c1-c2 £ (4/3)tf. 
We find from (16) that the difference 
of profits is positive and the subcontractor 
will take vertical supply if the fixed cost is 
sufficiently large, while taking vertical 
foreclosure if the fixed cost is sufficiently 
small and the difference of marginal cost 
is sufficiently large.  When the fixed cost 
is large, the subcontractor would suffer 
losses while taking vertical foreclosure 
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because he would produce a smaller 
quantity of intermediate input than 
vertical supply.  In contrast, the 
subcontractor would earn zero profit if 
taking vertical supply.  Consequently, 
vertical supply is a better choice when the 
fixed cost is sufficiently large.  On the 
other hand, the subcontractor would 
choose to locate at the same site of his 
rival due to cost advantage if the 
difference of marginal costs is sufficiently 
large.  When the fixed cost is sufficiently 
small, the subcontractor’s profits of 
vertical foreclosure might outweigh those 
of vertical supply.  This creates an 
incentive for him to take vertical 
foreclosure. 
 
? . The Subcontractor Acts as a 
Stackelberg Leader 
 
In this section, we assume instead 
that the subcontractor plays the role of a 
Stackelberg leader, while the consignor 
playing a follower in the intermediate 
input market.  Consequently, the 
subcontractor determines the subcontract 
term in the third stage by solving the 
following problem: 
Since the solving process of this case is 
similar to that in section ? , we shall 
ignore it here.  We also find that the 
consignor’s subcontracting profits are 
totally deprived by the Stackelberg leader, 
the subcontractor.  The equilibrium 
locations are derivable as follows: 
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We see from (18.1) that the 
equilibrium location of the consignor is at 
the left endpoint of the line market when 
the subcontractor plays the role of a 
Stackelberg leader.  The reason for this 
result is similar to that in previous section.  
Anticipating that his subcontracting 
profits will be completely deprived in the 
final stage, the consignor will locate as far 
away as possible from the rival firm to 
reduce the market price competition 
because the subcontracting effect is absent.  
Thus, the consignor will locate at the left 
endpoint of the line market. 
In addition, equation (18.2) shows 
that the subcontractor’s equilibrium 
location depends on the ratio, T, ranging 
between 0 and ¥.  By numerical 
calculation, we figure out that the 
equilibrium location declines from x2** » 1 
as the ratio equals 0.1 to x2** = 0 as the 
ratio approaches infinity, i.e., 0lim **2 »¥® xT .  
Thus, we find that the equilibrium 
location declines as the ratio rises.  
Accordingly, we can make the following 
induction.  Being a Stackelberg leader in 
the subcontracted input market, the 
subcontractor captures the entire 
subcontracting surplus incurred in the 
subcontracting deal.  Therefore, the 
larger the ratio, T, the stronger the 
subcontracting effect will be.  In order to 
save the transportation costs of shipping 
the subcontracted input, the subcontractor 
will locate closer to the consignor.  In the 
extreme case, the subcontracting effect 
outweighs the competition effect, making 
the subcontractor agglomerate with the 
consignor, when this ratio approaches 
infinity.  On the contrary, the 
subcontracting effect is sufficiently small 
such that the subcontractor locates at the 
other endpoint, when this ratio is 
sufficiently small, say T = 0.1.  Thus, we 
can establish the following proposition: 
We now turn to study the 
subcontractor’s vertical foreclosure 
decision when he is a Stackelberg leader 
in the subcontracting stage.  Considering 
(18.1) and (18.2) and the first-order 
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condition for location decision, we can 
derive the subcontractor’s profits in the 
case of vertical supply when he is a 
Stackelberg leader. 
We find from (20) that the difference 
of profits between vertical supply and 
vertical foreclosure is positive and the 
subcontractor will take vertical supply, if 
the difference of marginal costs is 
sufficiently large.  This arises because 
the two firms will agglomerate at left 
endpoint and the subcontractor could only 
earn the difference of marginal costs 
minus fixed cost while taking vertical 
foreclosure.  However, the 
subcontractor’s profits of vertical supply 
are at least greater than the difference of 
marginal costs while taking vertical supply.  
On the other hand, when the transport rate 
of the final good, tf, is sufficiently small 
such that the two firms agglomerate at the 
left endpoint while taking vertical supply, 
the subcontractor would just be able to 
earn the difference of marginal costs.  
Moreover, the two firms would take apart 
and locate at the opposite endpoints of the 
line market and could charge higher prices 
and profits while taking vertical 
foreclosure, if the difference of marginal 
costs is below tf.  Accordingly, we obtain 
the result that the subcontractor would 
take foreclosure if the difference of 
marginal costs, the fixed cost and the 
transport rate of the final good are 
sufficiently small. 
 
???????? 
 
On self-evaluation, I have completed 
all of the objectives proposed in the 
project and found several striking results.  
They are stated as follows and I think this 
paper is publishable. 
First of all, we show that while 
taking vertical supply, the principle of 
Minimum Differentiation arises, when the 
ratio between the transport rate of the 
subcontracted input and that of the final 
product is sufficiently large.  On the 
contrary, the principle of Maximum 
Differentiation takes place if this ratio is 
sufficiently small. 
Secondly, the two firms will 
agglomerate at the endpoints of the line 
market where the rival of the Stackelberg 
leader locates instead of agglomerating at 
the center of the line market due to the 
role of Stackelberg leadership.  It is 
noteworthy that the agglomeration arises 
at the endpoint of the line market where 
the rival locates instead of agglomerating 
at the center of the line market. 
Thirdly,  we have shown that a small 
fixed cost is crucial in subcontractor’s 
decision of taking vertical foreclosure.  
However, the role of the difference of 
marginal costs between the two firms is 
ambiguous.  A large difference of 
marginal costs is needed if the 
subcontractor is a Stackelberg follower in 
the subcontracted input market, while the 
condition is reversed if he is a leader. 
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